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THE CHILEAN COPPER NATIONALIZATION: THE
FOUNDATION FOR A STANDARD OF "APPROPRIATE"
COMPENSATION
INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 1971, the Constitution of Chile was amended to
authorize state nationalization of the copper industry.1 The formula
announced by Chile for determining the compensation to be paid for
the property taken raises several significant issues concerning the obligations of a nationalizing state to an alien property owner under
international law. In order to effectively analyze the Chilean standard,
which has been the subject of numerous conflicting commentaries
concerning its legitimacy, other established standards must be examined to determine whether they find support in traditional international law. Only then will it be possible to resolve the more difficult
question of whether the Chilean formula is actually premised on, or2
contrary to, contemporary international and general principles of law.
I. THE

TRADITIONAL POSITIONS ON COMPENSATION

A. The Communist Position: No Compensation
Three diverse standards of compensation have been acknowledged
in the twentieth century. The first, and perhaps simplest position, is
1. Act of July 15, 1971, amending CHILE CONST. art. 10, § 10 (concerning nationalizing the major mining industry, [19713 Diario Oficial (Chile) as translated in 10
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1067 (1971)). The complete text of the act is given. The
recent political events in Chile will probably have little effect on the nationalization.
The new government has not indicated that it is going to change its policy in this
area and even if it should, the analysis of the standard would not be affected. However, the discussion of Chile's application of the standard could be superseded by such
a change.
2. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1368-69 (1971), lists the sources of law which
the court can use to decide disputes. This paper will draw upon all of those sources:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teach-

ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
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that held by the Communist bloc countries who maintain that there
is no international law obligation on the part of the confiscating state
to pay any compensation. 3 Generally, there is little noncommunist support for this assertion. Numerous scholars have maintained that the
state is legally required to pay for the property taken. 4 Moreover, since
World War II more than 72 international compensation agreements,,
many of which have been negotiated with Communist countries,0
acknowledge a duty on the part of the state to pay for an alien's property which it has taken. The principle of compensation is also recognized in over 80 bilateral treaties, 7 as well as in the decisions of international tribunals8 and municipal courts0
The duty of a state to pay compensation to an alien for property taken was codified by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 14, 1962, in paragraph four of the Resolution On Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources which requires that "the
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation."' 1 When this resolution is read in light of the withdrawal of the Afghanistan resolution
which only compelled the state to pay "adequate compensation, when
and where appropriate," and defeat of the Russian amendment which
allowed "unobstructed expropriation," it is clear that reimburse3. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-29 (1964).
4.

See, e.g., G. WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY

231-43 (1961);

B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-35 (1959); Delson,

Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private International Law, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 755, 763 (1967); Domke, Foreign Nationalizations,
55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 603 (1961).
5. I. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION AND COMPENSATION 305 (1964).

6. See Committee on Int'l Law, The Compensation Requirement in the Taking
of Alien Property, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 195 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report]. Appendix III, part B lists over 50 treaties entered into between 1945 and
1967 by Communist and Western countries which recognize the duty to compensate
for past takings of property.
7. Committee Report, App. III, pt. A. While it is true that these bilateral treaties
are by their terms only binding on the parties to them, they are evidence of the practice of states to which courts look in ascertaining and applying customary international
law.

8. Id. at App. I.
9. Id. at 211-16.
10. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962)
(emphasis added).
§ 4 Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and
foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation,
in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in
the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.

Id.

COMMENTS

ment is obligatory, not discretionary." This conclusion is buttressed by
the fact that aside from Russia, whose amendment was defeated, all
other juridical arguments raised in the debate clearly endorsed the
2
view that international law requires the payment of compensation.
Since the Communist position does not adhere to this principle, it
must be summarily dismissed as improper. The two other established
standards recognize this principle as a state duty and address themselves
to the issue of the measure of compensation due the alien for his
property.
B. The Third World Position:National Treatment
The developing countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia
espouse the principle of "national or equal treatment" under which
the state must compensate aliens for confiscated property only in those
instances where domestic law requires it to compensate its own nationals. 13 The alien is entitled to receive reparation in an amount
equal to that which a national of the country would receive in the
same factual situation. This theory conflicts with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 which requires that compensation be
paid "in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.' ' 14 The resolution is a positive reaffirmation of the
basic principle that compensation must be paid in accordance with
international standards.' 5 Since the Third World position only chooses
to incorporate national criteria, it too must be rejected as contrary to
international law.
C. The United States Position: Prompt, Adequate and Effective
Compensation
The United States maintains that compensation must be "prompt,
adequate and effective" in order to satisfy the requirements of interna11. Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463, 465-66 (1963); see Gess, Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398 (1964).
12. Gess, supra note 11, at 426; Schwebel, supra note 11, at 466.
13. Fatouros, InternationalLaw and the Third World, 50 VA. L. REv. 783, 807-08
(1964).
14. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962)
(emphasis added). Although it is possible to argue for other interpretations, the use of
the word "and" requires the rejection of the theory of national treatment which can
only be justified by omitting or ignoring "and" when interpreting the resolution.
15. Gess, supra note 11, at 448.
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tional law."' Although United Nations General Assembly Resolution
1803 calls for the payment of only "appropriate compensation,"' 7 it
has been asserted that the legislative history of the resolution proves
that it is merely a codification of the United States position.' 8 As will
be shown, however, the cumulative effect of the actual wording of
the resolution, the position of courts and writers on nationalization
and the history of previous settlements requires repudiation of this
interpretation.
The position of the United States must be rejected as inapplicable
to nationalizations because it fails to comply with the economic realities of the situation. As the nature of property deprivations has
changed, scholars have come to recognize a salient distinction between
expropriation and nationalization. 9 An expropriation is viewed as a
limited or individualized taking,20 while a nationalization constitutes
a wholesale seizure not restricted in scope or specialized in nature. 2'
This shift in the magnitude of property taken has required a subsequent modification of the legal theory governing the measure of compensation to be paid. Garcia Amador, reporter of a United Nations
study on International Responsibility, stated that nationalizations may
be of such enormity as to render "full" compensation truly illusory.
This fact, he concluded, is reflected in many postwar national constitutions which refer only to "fair," "equitable" or "reasonable" compensation, or which expressly leave the quantum of actual compensa22
tion to be paid at the time of the taking to the state's discretion.
This alteration in the magnitude of divestiture has also affected the
timing of the reimbursement. In large scale deprivations, fixed schedules for the payment of the agreed remuneration must necessarily depend on the varying circumstances in each case, more particularly on
16.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§§ 186-90 (1965).

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

17. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).

18. Schwebel, supra note 11, at 466. He does recognize that it is a mixed record,
but argues that it is predominantly favorable.
19. See, e.g., S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1953);
W. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 467 (1957); Delson, supra
note 4, at 764-68.
20. Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal Standard
of Compensation?, 30 FODHAm L. REV. 727, 732 (1962).
21. L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS

113 (1961).

22. Amador, (Fourth) Report on International Responsibility, in [1959] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 20 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/119 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Fourth
Report].

COMMENTS

the state's resources and actual capacity to pay.23 Even in the case of
"partial" compensation, very few of the developing nations are in a
sufficiently strong economic and financial position to be able to make
immediate reparations in full.2 4 Deferred compensation has, therefore, become the norm when large segments of the economy of a coun25
try have been nationalized.
The fact that a nationalization requires utilization of different
principles than an expropriation was recognized by a German court
when it discussed the nationalization of Dutch assets by Indonesia. 26
The tribunal held that the timing and quantity of payment is contingent on the economic, political and social conditions prevalent in
the nationalizing state.2 7 This ruling was mandated by the fact that
if extensive deprivations were governed by the United States standard,
the dominant capital exporting powers would have a veto power over
the legitimate attempts of developing nations to achieve fundamental
economic and social reforms.2 8 Thus, economic reality requires the
rejection of the United States standard.
Twentieth century settlements provide considerable support for
this position. In 1938, Mexico nationalized British, American and
Dutch oil properties valued at $500 million. Compensation of $155
million was tendered in complete discharge of the claims. 29 Similarly,
when Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the remunerations totaled less than the estimated worth of the property taken.3 0 A
final illustration is Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956,
for which aliens were paid compensation equal to one half of the appraised value of the property seized. 31 The authors of one leading
article concluded that although differences in timing, amount and the
form of payment preclude any definitive statement as to what the
international law standard is (if indeed one exists), a thorough
examination of such representative settlements does reveal that claim23. Id. at 22.
24. Id.
25. L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, supra note 21, at 113.
26. N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatzschappijen v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.h., 28 I.L.R. 16 (Court of Appeals, Bremen, Federal Republic of Germany 1959).

27. Id.
28.
14 VILL.
29.
30.
31.

Rafat, Compensation for Expropriated Property in Recent International Law,
L. REv. 199, 258 (1969).
Dawson & Weston, supra note 20, at 740-41.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 747-49.
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ants have never received "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation.3
It has also been maintained by the United States that the state
cannot expropriate or nationalize property unless it is taken for a
public purpose.3 What constitutes a public purpose, however, has
rarely been discussed by international tribunals and never has property been restored to its former owner because the taking was considered to be for other than a public purpose.3 4 Thus, when the International Court was asked to review the public purpose aspects underlying a nationalization, it could only retort that "the Belgium
Government was the sole judge of this critical situation and of the
remedies that it called for."8 5 A similar position was taken by Garcia
Amador who stated that it is for municipal law, not international law,
to define in each case the "public purpose" or motive for the nationalization. 36 These opinions reveal that either there is no international
standard or that international law has recognized the domestic standard as determinative. Under either interpretation the public purpose
limitation can be readily dismissed as having no influence over the
actions of the state.
Thus, the standards of the United States and the two other representative models must be rejected as improper for determining the
legitimacy of a nationalizing state's actions under international law.
The only recognized international law limitation on a state's action is
its duty to pay appropriate compensation. Although this cryptic maxim
is as yet imprecisely defined, several legal scholars have attempted the
task. Doman has characterized United Nations Resolution 1803, which
introduced the concept of appropriate compensation, as a compromise
between the capital exporting and capital importing states.87 A parallel view was taken by Wolfgang Friedmann who thought that although
the resolution was capable of diverse interpretations, it was deliberately imprecise, so as to balance the equities in the various situations
in which it would be employed. He also believed that it reflected an
evolutionary trend away from the formerly predominant Western32. Id. at 740.
33. L. SOHN & R.
34. Id.

BAXTER, supra note

21, at 107.

35. Oscar Chinn Case P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63, 65, at 79 (1934).
36. See Fourth Report 12-13.
37. Doman, New Developments in the Field of Nationalization, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 306, 316-17 (1970).
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sponsored principles to a more flexible principle that takes into account the circumstances under which the interests were acquired. 3
This explication of the "appropriate compensation" standard furnishes
guidance in analyzing the Chilean formula and in determining whether
it conforms to international law requirements.

II.

THE CHILEAN STANDARD

Chile's law authorizing state nationalization stipulates that compensation to be paid affected companies will be measured by book
value as of December 31, 1970, with no right to compensation for loss
of mineral deposits. 3 The sum awarded, however, will be diminished
40
by deductions for assets which are not in good operating condition
as well as for excess profits previously taken by the nationalized companies. 41 Payment will be made in legal tender disbursed over a period
not to exceed thirty years.4 Since the most controversial feature of the
Chilean formula is the excess profits deduction it will be discussed
first, followed by an analysis of the utilization of book value and the
deferral of payment.
A. PrinciplesSupportingthe Excess ProfitsProvision
It has been maintained that, unlike the utilization of the cost of
the property as the unit of valuation, the excess profits analysis has
no underlying historical precedent in international law. Furthermore,
it is argued that the concept of retroactively recouping profits earned
in accordance with contractual agreements sanctioned by existing
municipal law is an erosion of that law.43 Contrary to such assertions,
there is precedent for the deduction of excess profits and the practice
is firmly rooted in both generally accepted principles of contract law
and in specific provisions of United States law.
38. Friedmann, Half a Century of InternationalLaw, 50 VA. L. REv. 1333, 1352
(1964).
39. Act of July 15, 1971, amending CHILE CONST. art. 10, § 10, in 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1067, 1068-69 (1971).
40. Id. at 1069.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Statement of Secretary of State, William Rogers, Oct. 13, 1971, in 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATEMAL~LS 1307 (1971) (in response to Chilean compensation announcement).
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Firm historical precedents for the Chilean excess profits deduction
can be found in both the Iranian and Egyptian nationalizations. In an
address announcing the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal
Company, President Nasser justified Egypt's position by pointing to
the adhesive nature of the original concession agreement and by
charging the company with earning unreasonable profits. 44 A similar
accusation was made by Iranian officials during a United Nations debate concerning the compensation claims of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company. Iran charged that inordinate profits ranging between $500
and $550 million had been made annually by the company while the
45
government had only received $45 million per year for the grant.
The Iranians also stressed this point during negotiations with the
company and instituted a counterclaim which called for:
Examination of the claims of both parties on the basis of the fairest
concession agreements of the oil producing countries in the world,
where the cost of producing oil, according to that concession, is not
cheaper than
the cost of producing Iranian oil during a correspond46
ing period.
Iran demanded that the terms and conditions of its concession be compared with other grants given during the same period by other nations as a gauge of its fairness. In the final negotiations, $122 million
in Iranian claims were recognized. 47 Although the precise make-up
of the award was not given, it is plausible to assume that at least some
portion of this amount constituted reimbursement for excess profits
previously earned by the company.
Additional support for the excess profits deduction can be found
in the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Concession agreements are similar to the public law contracts recognized
by leading legal systems of the world, either explicitly in the "contrat
administratif" of the civil systems, or in the government contract of
the common law system. 48 The dominant principle of these contracts
44. Speech by President Nasser, July 26, 1956, in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNA1956, at 77 (1959).
45. 6 U.N. SCOR, 563rd meeting 15 (1955).

TIONAL AFFAIRS, DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

46. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
TIONAL AFFAIRS 1952, at 346 (1955).

AFFAIRS,

DOCUMENTS

ON

INTERNA-

47. Rafat, supra note 28, at 233.
48. Friedmann, Social Conflict and the Protection of Foreign Investment, 57 PRoa.
Am. SoC. INT'L L. 126, 128 (1963). Both contract and property principles will be used
to support the Chilean standard since the taking by a state of an alien's rights under
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is the pre-eminence of the public interest.49 In both the common and
civil law systems the government has a residual power to terminate or
alter existing contracts with private parties when it does so in the
public interest.5 0 This intrinsic power is retained by the government
because of the host of unforeseeable changes that political, economic
and social events may bring.5'
The renegotiation of defense contracts exemplifies the use of the
government's residual power to alter or terminate existing agreements in the United States.0 Initially, the Renegotiation Board, an
independent federal agency, was established to control profit accumulation during World War

11.

53

This is done through a two step process.

Contract prices reflecting the bulk of defense expenditures are fixed
in the first instance, and often reestablished, by government officials
in a procedure that is a combination of negotiation with the seller
and unilateral decision-making by the government. 54 In some cases
the price may be further modified by the decision of contracting officials in other government agencies even after the contract has been
finalized. 55 Thus, if corporation A had three separate contracts, each
of them would be the subject of individual negotiation and alteration.
The Renegotiation Board also annually reviews the overall profits
of many defense contractors to determine whether they are excessive. 56
This is done by examining the total profits made by corporation A on
the three contracts to determine whether they are inordinate. If the
Board finds that a contractor has realized inordinate profits in any
given year, it directs him to refund the excess amount. This aspect of
review has become increasingly important with the result that renegoa contract with the state is governed by the same principles as the taking of an alien's
property. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 195(a). Also, no decision of an international
tribunal has been found dealing specifically with the question of a state's expropriation of a contract between it and an alien as distinct from the expropriation of the
property of an alien. Id. at § 195 (Reporter's Notes).
49. Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 AM: J. INT'L L. 279, 292 (1963).
50. Friedmann, supra note 48, at 129.
51. Id.
52. War and Defense Contract Acts, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1211-23 (1970), as amended,

50 U.S.C. §§ 1211-23 (Supp. II 1972).
53. See generally Walsh, War Profits and Legislative Policy, 11 U. CRT. L. Rav.
191 (1944).
54. Marcus, The Need for Standards in Renegotiation and Other Determinations
of Defense Profits, 32 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 23, 28 (1963).
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id. at 29.
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tiation is now conducted retrospectively with regard to all business
contracts after the completion of the fiscal year rather than prospectively on the basis of individual contracts.5 7 Renegotiation has become
a means for recapturing excessive profits, rather than for repricing
contracts in order to prevent the accumulation of such profits. 8 This
change in focus, and the fact that statutory authority for renegotiation has been amended and extended ten times, suggests that firms
which have taken undue advantage of their bargaining position are
legally accountable to the government. A similar view is expressed by
nationalizing governments. 9 One is left with the conclusion that the
United States is already employing a principle on the domestic level
that Chile is attempting to utilize on the international level.
The excess profits deduction is also supported by the principle
of unconscionability which is embodied in the Uniform Commercial
Code and utilized by courts in the United States when dealing with
private contracts.
If a court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may
so limit the application of any unconscionable clause so as to avoid
any unconscionable result. 60
Although freedom of contract in the absence of fraud or illegality has
long been recognized, the Uniform Commercial Code has invested
courts with an explicit power to police contracts or clauses which they
find to be unconscionable in order to prevent oppression and unfair
surprise. 6
The term "unconscionable" defies exact definition, but there are
two factual situations in which it is normally recognized. It has generally been found to exist when there is both an absence of meaning57. Note, Reform of the Renegotiation Process in Government Contracting, 39
GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1971).

58. See id.; Braucher, The Renegotiation Act of 1951, 66 Hav. L. REV. 270, 276
(1952).
59. Wesley, Establishing Minimum Compensation Criteria for Use in Expropriation Disputes, 25 VAND. L. REV. 939, 952-53 (1972).
60. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1). Although it is not directly applicable
due to the nature of the contract, it is analogous.
61. Frostifresh, Inc. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 27-28, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759
(Nassau Co. Dist. Ct. 1966).
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ful choice on the part of one of the parties and contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.6 2 The element of a
meaningful unencumbered choice can be negated by a gross inequality
of bargaining power.6 3 This situation often prevails where standard
contracts with broad disclaimers are used. 64 In the automobile industry, for example, all the companies use the uniform warranty contract
of the Automobile Manufacturer's Association which the customer
has "imposed upon him." No bargaining is involved; if the customer
wants the car, he must take the contract. The absence of bargaining and
assent by the customer caused one court to refuse to enforce the disclaimer of liability.6 5
The second factual situation in which a court will customarily
find a contract to be unconscionable is one in which a party drives
"too hard a bargain."6 6 Typical examples of this type of agreement
are: an appliance valued at $348 is sold for $1,145.88;67 a freezer
worth $300 is sold for $1,439.66; 18 and a home renovation contract for
$2,568.60, of which over $1,600 is for interest and commission. 69 In all
of these situations the courts disapproved of the enormous amount
of profit being made by the vendors and therefore altered the contract to achieve a more equitable result.
In essence, Chile is attempting to achieve the same result through
the application of the excess profits deduction. The necessity for such
an adjustment is rooted in the bargaining position of the country
when it grants the original concession. In most cases the grantor nation is in a very weak posture, for although it has an abundance of
natural resources, it lacks the financial means and technical knowl62. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
63. Id. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
64. L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES 447 (2d ed. 1959). See generally Ehrenzweig,
Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Law, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 1072, 1089 (1953);
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REv.629 (1943).
65. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
66. Frostifresh, Inc. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759
(Nassau Co. Dist. Ct. 1966).
67. Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
68. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1969).
69. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 439, 201 A.2d

886, 888 (1964).
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edge necessary to successfully develop them.70 If the country is to receive desperately needed revenue from its natural resources, it is
compelled to agree to the terms dictated by the foreign company. An
even more blatant example of the inequality of the parties' bargaining positions occurs when a concession is granted by a developing nation which is subject to foreign political or military domination. Such
grants result in financial terms starkly different from those prevailing
in an open market. It would be unrealistic and inequitable to disregard the excess profits that have accrued to the foreign investors
who have benefited from the power wielded by their protector governments. 71 Thus, the factual background underlying the grant must
be examined, for it may contain the very elements which the court
takes exception to in the typical unconscionability case. Generally, a
gross inequality of bargaining power, with the company driving a
very hard bargain and reaping large unreasonable profits, will suffice
as a basis for contract modification.
1. Retroactive Application. Although there is ample justification
for the excess profits deduction, it has nevertheless been argued that
it should only be applied prospectively. It is maintained that retroactive application would break sharply with the ethical considerations
of expectancy and reliance that have shaped the normative rules of
international conduct.7 2 Such a position must be regarded as thoroughly
unsound for several reasons. First, it should be recalled that the deduction does not reach all profits, but only those which have been
70. See Moran, Politics of Economic Nationalism and the Evolution of Concession
Agreements, 66 PROC. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 216 (1972). The article discusses the shifting nature of the power held by the parties to a concession agreement. Normally, the
state is in a very-weak bargaining position when the agreement is entered into. Thus
the court uses the excess profits deduction to correct the initial imbalance of power
which enabled the company to achieve the extremely favorable concession. As the article
points out, however, when the company's property is taken the power is held by the
state which now has the skilled personnel to run the operation and no longer needs
the capital or skill of the company. The court must also protect the company which
now is in a weak bargaining position.
71. Friedmann, supra note 49, at 298. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel, Inc.,
315 U.S. 289 (1942), the federal government contended that it could escape the duty
of paying agreed sums to the defendant due to the fact that the company had used
duress to exact an excessive price by taking advantage of the government's desperate
need for World War I shipping. Although the government failed in this contention,
with only Justice Frankfurter accepting the duress argument, the majority opinion can
be interpreted as holding that the duress argument failed only because at the time of
entering the contract the government could have requisitioned what it wanted instead
of buying it. This, of course, is an option which is not available to an undeveloped
nation.
72. See Wesley, supra note 59, at 955.
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found to be truly inequitable. Although such profits may be legal in
reference to the contract, this does not necessarily mean that the contract itself is equitable. Secondly, the United States has been making
retroactive deductions for almost thirty years in defense contracting.
Finally, in many countries the prospective utilization of the deduction
would in reality be of no use once the properties have been nationalized.
2. Method for DeterminingExcess Profits. The Chilean act adopts
a comparative method of determining excess profits which is well suited
to a fair determination of the amount of excess profits realized.
The President of the Republic is hereby empowered to order the
Comptroller General, in computing the compensation, to deduct all
or part of the excess profits earned by the nationalized companies and
their predecessors annually . . . giving special consideration to the
normal profits they have obtained in their international operations
as a whole, or resulting from agreements which the Chilean State
may have concluded on the matter of maximum
profitability of for3
eign companies established in the countryP
This procedure corresponds to the system contained in Iran's counterclaim which called for a comparison of the concession of the AngloIranian Oil Co. with similar grants.74 Such a methodology incorporates several salutary features. The comparative standard is not overly
difficult to apply since the exact profit figures are readily available in
many cases. Secondly, the employment of this standard focuses the
arguments on concrete quantitative terms instead of such qualitative
and subjective tests as "excessive" or "exploitative." The comparative
method also permits a factual dispute to be formulated in terms which
a court can comfortably handle. Although there will be disputes as to
whether a given company or year should be included in the computation, such conflicts are precisely the type of questions a court is best
equipped to resolve.
3. Chilean Application of Excess Profits Deduction. When Chile
first announced the nationalization of the copper companies, its promise to pay fair compensation was favorably greeted. Once the amount
of the excess profits deduction was announced, however, the American
press characterized the entire activity as a sham wrapped in the trap73. Act of July 15, 1971, amending CHILE CONST. art. 10, § 10, in 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1067, 1069 (1971).
74. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
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pings of legality. 75 Thus Chile's application of the standard caused the
entire concept to be discredited. In analyzing the propriety of Chile's
actions, statistics supplied by the Kennecott Copper Co. will be used.
These are the only figures currently available since Chile has not yet
chosen to disclose how Kennecott's $410 million excess profits deduction was computed.7 6
The Chilean excess profits deduction calls for a comparison of the
company's profits in Chile with two other standards. The first gives
"special consideration to the normal profitability they [Kennecott]
have obtained in their international operations as a whole. ' 77 The company reported that over a 15 year period its net earnings befores taxes
from El Teniente, its nationalized Chilean mine, were 32 percent
higher than those of Kennecott's domestic mines.7 Nevertheless, net
earnings after taxes for the Chilean mine were 45; percent below
Kennecott's domestic mine earnings and in no year did the El Teniente
investment earn more after taxes than did Kennecott's domestic operation. 79 The fact that the company's investments in Chile constituted
13.16 percent of its assets, while the Chilean operation earned 13.7 percent of world-wide company profits in a typical year, provides further
support for the conclusion that Kennecott did not reap excess profits
from El Teniente. 0
A second comparison is made with agreements which the Chilean
state may have concluded on the matter of maximum profitability of
75. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1971, at 30, col. 2; TIME, Oct. 11, 1971, at 97.
76. KENNECOTT COPPER CORP.,
WITHOUT COMPENSATION" ii (Supp.

CONFISCATION OF EL TENIENTE "EXPROPRIATION
1971) [hereinafter cited as KENNECOTT REPORT].

The Kennecott Copper Co. has made available five reports, which provide the company's
position, and various court decisions and arguments of both counsels. The author was
not able to find an explanation of the excess profits amount in any source. A request
to the Chilean mission at the United Nations did not result in any new information.
The decision of the Special Copper Tribunal was confined solely to the question of
whether the tribunal had the competence to review President Allende's deduction. Since
the tribunal found that it lacked such judicial review power, it did not proceed to discuss the President's excess profits calculation. It is conceivable in view of the recent
changes in the political structure of Chile that there may be an alteration in the deduction or an explanation of how the original amount was calculated.
77. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
78. KENNECOTT REPORT 51.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 50. Contra, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1971, at 72, cols. 4-5. In an advertisement explaining its position Chile contends that Kennecott made 21.37 percent of its
profit from its Chilean operations. It should be noted that no year is given for when this
occurred. Anaconda, which has been extremely quiet throughout the entire affair, is
accused in the same advertisement of making 79.24 percent of its profit from an investment in Chile which only represented 16.64 percent of its overall investment.
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foreign companies in the country.8 ' One such agreement is the Andean Pact which provides for a permissible rate of return of 14 percent
on such investments8 2 During the most recent six-year period Braden,
Kennecott's subsidiary operating El Teniente, reported that it had received an annual income of approximately $21 million.8 3 Since El
Teniente's assets had a book value of $329 million, application of the
"fourteen percent rule" would have permitted Braden a legitimate
return of $22.6 million per year. 4 Both of these comparative tests
raise uncertainty as to whether Kennecott realized excessive profits.
However, the improper application of the deduction should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that there is strong support for the concept
of excess profit deductions.
B. PrinciplesJustifying the Use of Book Value
Once the amount of excess profits earned by the company is determined, it is deducted from the company's book value in computing
the compensation owed the nationalized industry. Although the use of
book value conflicts with the demand by American companies for the
payment of "going concern" value, considerable support for the Chilean
position can be found in the nature of mining concessions in South
America, the method of capitalization and the decisions of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission.
1. Mining Concessions. The statutes of a majority of Central and
South American countries treat domestic mines as distinct and separate
entities. With the exception of Brazil, all mineral deposits found
within the earth become the exclusive property of the nation. Therefore, regardless of who might possess or own the surface area, ownership of the minerals is inalienably vested in the nation. 5 The concession issued by the state is only a temporary right to exploit a particular mine, with exclusive possession reverting to the state after the
grant's expiration.8 6 This position is the antithesis of that adopted in
81. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
82. KENNECOTT REPORT 46. Chile has signed the Andean Pact with Bolivia,
Peru, Ecuador and Columbia.
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. 2 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION,
MINING § 13.1 (1973).

THE AMERICAN LAW OF

86. Campbell, Principles of Mineral Ownership in the Civil Law and Common
Law Systems, 31 TUL. L. Rav. 303, 310 (1956).
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the United States. The American law of minerals is deeply rooted in
the English common law which gives the occupant of the surface complete dominion over the underlying minerals whether solid, oil or gas.8 7
This difference in the nature of the property right held by the private
party is of critical importance when determining "going concern"
value.
"Going concern" value is premised on the theory that the government is in a position similar to that of a private corporation buying
another corporation which is presently functioning and will continue
to do so in the future. In the United States, since the ownership of
the minerals on the property vests in the private company being
purchased, the buyer must pay for the physical assets of the company
and the right to mine those minerals. The value of the company on
the open market would be determined by these two factors. However,
in the South American countries the ownership of the minerals vests
in the state with the private company having only a temporary right
to exploit a particular area. The company's right of exploitation is
further limited by the fact that since a concession is an exclusive contract to mine a certain mineral, any power of alienation must be found
within the terms of that specific contract or in the mining code of the
country. In the majority of Central and South American countries the
mining codes provide that "no transfer may be made until prior
authorization is given by some official in the mining department of
88
that governient."
The foreign concessionaire's property interest in the mineral is
comparable in nature to an FCC license held by an American radio or
television station. An FCC license does not constitute a vested property right in the hands of the recipient; the license is revocable and
may be transferred only with the permission of the commission.89
The policy of the [Communications] Act is clear that no person is to
have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the
87. Id. at 304; Maria, Perspectives on Spanish American Legal Norms Governing
Mining Concessions, "Chileanization," and the Consensus of Vina del Mar, 11 VA. J.
INT'L L. 177 (1971).
88.

2 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION,

MINING § 13.12 (1973)

THE AMERICAN LAw OF

(emphasis added).

89. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 744-45 (1964). But see Stapleton, Intangible Assets and the Television Industry, 45 TAXEs 685, 686 (1967). The
Federal Communications Commission almost automatically approves all renewal and
transfer requests. This approval is so dependable that the Internal Revenue does not
allow the license to be depreciated because it is of indeterminate duration.
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granting of a license. Licenses are limited to a maximum of three
years' duration, may be revoked, and need not be renewed. 90
Despite the revocable nature of a license holder's property interest, it constitutes the major asset acquired by the purchaser of a
television or radio station.91 Revocation or failure to renew the franchise transforms a going business into the ownership of a physical
plant of little value.9 2 Although the license is a significant component
of the total value of the station, the Government will not compensate
those individuals whose licenses are revoked.
[I]f a television station's license were revoked, not for bad behavior
on the part of the operator, but in order to provide a channel in another locality, or to provide an outlet for educational television, the
holder would not be compensated for its loss. 93
Revocation of an FCC license exemplifies the general principle
that the United States Government does not have to pay compensation for a value which it has created. The principle is also applied in
other contexts. In United States v. Cors,914 the Supreme Court held that
the just compensation required to be paid to the proprietor of a tug
requisitioned by the Government during World War II should not
include the appreciation created by the government's own increased
demand for such vessels. The court held this a "value which the government itself created and hence in fairness should not be required to
pay."0 5 Similarly, in United States v. Fuller,96 the defendant claimed
additional compensation for the enhanced value of his condemned
land. The claim was rejected because the added value could be attributed to the property's proximity to federal lands for which the
claimant held grazing permits. No compensation was required for this
augmented value since Cors and the navigational servitude cases "go
far toward establishing the principle that the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements
'9 7
of value that the Government has created.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
Stapleton, supra note 89, at 686.
Id.
Reich, supra note 89, at 745.
337 U.S. 325 (1949).
Id. at 334.

96. 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
97. Id. at 492.
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The above examples can be used to highlight the parallels between domestic practices and the nationalization of Latin American
mining concessions. The assets of a mining company in South America
consist of physical properties such as offices, equipment, railroad tracks
and the concession which gives the purchaser the right to extract minerals from the property. The concession is a separate component of
total value, similar in nature to an FCC license. By drawing on American case law, one can convincingly argue that the concession is a
value which the government has created and, thus, is not required to
compensate for. It is logical to conclude that the state is only required
to pay for the physical assets of the company which will have little
value on the open market without the concession. Hence a nationalization can be described as a forced sale in which the government can
acquire the assets on its own terms.98 The forced-sale method of
valuing the assets is extremely inequitable, for the company relied upon
the government's concession in investing the capital necessary to develop the mines. Although the government has the right to cancel
the concession, it should not be allowed to induce investment and then
exploit its position by arbitrarily setting the purchase price on physical plant and equipment which have become worthless due to the
concession's cancellation. The use of book value protects the company's
capital by requiring the state to pay a predetermined price for the
physical assets.
2. Capitalization Method. Nationalizations are typically accompanied by high political and ideological tensions and characterized by
a climate of extreme distrust between the state and the private entity
whose property has been taken. It would seem advisable to arrive at
the amount of compensation to be paid by methods most capable of
objective application. It was noted above that Chile prefers to pay
book value for assets it nationalizes whereas the United States is an
advocate of going concern value. Going concern value or market value
is calculated by the capitalization method; it is arrived at by multiplying the annual net earnings of a company by a capitalization factor. 9
98.

Although it can be argued that the company is making annual payments for

the concession and the television license is free, the payment can also be treated as a
depletion remuneration.
99. Girvan, The Question of Compensation: A Third World Perspective, 5 VAND.
J. TRANS. L. 340, 350 (1972). But see 4 P. NicHoLs, EmiNENT DoiAmN § 12.3121 (3d
ed. 1971). The capitalization of income method involves the mathematical capitaliza-
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The capitalization factor is a subject of heated debate since it is arrived
at by negotiations between the parties. Needless to say, the' total
amount of compensation can vary considerably depending upon how
the capitalization is applied. For example, Kennecott determined that
its interest in El Teniente was worth $175 million when it used the
standards employed by the Lena Goldfields Tribunal.10 0 In a second
application of accepted standards, however, the total value of their interest was said to be $490 million.10 1 There is a difference of $315 million, depending upon how the method is applied. The use of book
value would eliminate the need for making such highly speculative
calculations and reduce the disruptive effect of the nationalization.
Further support for the use of book value by Chile can be found in
the practice of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the
United States which traditionally applies book value as part of its
methodology in making awards. Prior to 1969, the FCSC relied almost
exclusively on book value, especially when large claims were involved.1 02 In 1969, the commission began to appraise selected claims
on a "going concern" basis with a multiplier of 10 soon becoming
standard. 1 3 Nevertheless, book value still remains the commission's
prevalent approach,104 particularly when dealing with nationalized
mines and wells. °5
tion of income from the property but not income from a business conducted upon the
property. For example, income from a garage, a laundry, a restaurant, etc., would be
inadmissible because this is income from a business conducted upon the property. Rental
income, on the other hand, is admissible because it is income from the property. This
is due to the fact that other factors, such as management skill, technology, and productivity play an important part in determining the income of the business. These factors are separate from the income of the property itself.
100. KENNECOTT REPORT 83. But see Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the
Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950).
The Soviet Union made an initial appearance before the tribunal and then refused to
participate in the proceedings. The tribunal, however, continued its proceedings and
awarded $62,232,000 to the company. The English government figured the actual loss
at $16,800,000 and the award was criticized in the House of Lords as being excessive.
101. KENNECOTT REPORT 83.
102. Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, in THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 95, 105-11 (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
103. Id. at 112-14. This should be compared with Kennecott's capitalization value
of $490 million which would require a multiple of 25.
104. Id. at 112 n.67.

105. Freidberg & Lockwood, The Measure of Damages in Claims Against Cuba, in
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 123-25
(R. Lillich ed. 1972).
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C. Deferralof Payment
The Chilean Nationalization Act provides for payment over a
period, not to exceed 30 years. 0 6 It is a well documented fact that
most Third World nations are not in a financial position to provide prompt payment, thus economic reality requires that payment be
made on a deferred basis. 10 7 If a company insists on its right to receive
prompt compensation, it is actually depriving the state of the right to
nationalize. There is, however, a method which reconciles the interests
of the parties and provides an ample source of funds. This is achieved
when the compensation is paid from the future earnings of the nationalized enterprise. Precedent exists for the use of such deferred payment schemes. This method was selected to provide part of the payment in the Iranian nationalization of the oil industry, 0 8 and was
chosen by Bolivia and Gulf Oil in an agreement announced on September 10, 1970. Bolivia agreed to pay Gulf $78 million for its assets
over a 20 year period with the funds to be derived from the future
profits of the former Gulf installations. 09 Adoption of the deferred
payment method also weakens the developing nation's argument that
they are too destitute to pay compensation.
In conclusion, the provisions of the Chilean formula find considerable support in international law and general principles of law.
Although Chile's application of the standard raises serious questions,
this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the formula provides adequate protection for the interests of all parties. Thus, the
Chilean standard should not be summarily dismissed, but seriously
considered as an excellent first step towards defining an international
standard of "appropriate" compensation.
ALAN N. HEIBEIN
106.
107.
108.
109.

See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
Rafat, supra note 28, at 232.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1970, at 35, col. 4.

